Tag Archives: amplitudes

The Amplitudes Long View

Occasionally, other physicists ask me what the goal of amplitudes research is. What’s it all about?

I want to give my usual answer: we’re calculating scattering amplitudes! We’re trying to compute them more efficiently, taking advantage of simplifications and using a big toolbox of different approaches, and…

Usually by this point in the conversation, it’s clear that this isn’t what they were asking.

When physicists ask me about the goal of amplitudes research, they’ve got a longer view in mind. Maybe they’ve seen a talk by Nima Arkani-Hamed, declaring that spacetime is doomed. Maybe they’ve seen papers arguing that everything we know about quantum field theory can be derived from a few simple rules. Maybe they’ve heard slogans, like “on-shell good, off-shell bad”. Maybe they’ve heard about the conjecture that N=8 supergravity is finite, or maybe they’ve just heard someone praise the field as “demoting the sacred cows like fields, Lagrangians, and gauge symmetry”.

Often, they’ve heard a little bit of all of these. Sometimes they’re excited, sometimes they’re skeptical, but either way, they’re usually more than a little confused. They’re asking how all of these statements fit into a larger story.

The glib answer is that they don’t. Amplitudes has always been a grab-bag of methods: different people with different backgrounds, united by their interest in a particular kind of calculation.

With that said, I think there is a shared philosophy, even if each of us approaches it a little differently. There is an overall principle that unites the amplituhedron and color-kinematics duality, the CHY string and bootstrap methods, BCFW and generalized unitarity.

If I had to describe that principle in one word, I’d call it minimality. Quantum field theory involves hugely complicated mathematical machinery: Lagrangians and path integrals, Feynman diagrams and gauge fixing. At the end of the day, if you want to answer a concrete question, you’re computing a few specific kinds of things: mostly, scattering amplitudes and correlation functions. Amplitudes tries to start from the other end, and ask what outputs of this process are allowed. The idea is to search for something minimal: a few principles that, when applied to a final answer in a particular form, specify it uniquely. The form in question varies: it can be a geometric picture like the amplituhedron, or a string-like worldsheet, or a constructive approach built up from three-particle amplitudes. The goal, in each case, is the same: to skip the usual machinery, and understand the allowed form for the answer.

From this principle, where do the slogans come from? How could minimality replace spacetime, or solve quantum gravity?

It can’t…if we stick to only matching quantum field theory. As long as each calculation matches one someone else could do with known theories, even if we’re more efficient, these minimal descriptions won’t really solve these kinds of big-picture mysteries.

The hope (and for the most part, it’s a long-term hope) is that we can go beyond that. By exploring minimal descriptions, the hope is that we will find not only known theories, but unknown ones as well, theories that weren’t expected in the old understanding of quantum field theory. The amplituhedron doesn’t need space-time, it might lead the way to a theory that doesn’t have space-time. If N=8 supergravity is finite, it could suggest new theories that are finite. The story repeats, with variations, whenever amplitudeologists explore the outlook of our field. If we know the minimal requirements for an amplitude, we could find amplitudes that nobody expected.

I’m not claiming we’re the only field like this: I feel like the conformal bootstrap could tell a similar story. And I’m not saying everyone thinks about our field this way: there’s a lot of deep mathematics in just calculating amplitudes, and it fascinated people long before the field caught on with the Princeton set.

But if you’re asking what the story is for amplitudes, the weird buzz you catch bits and pieces of and can’t quite put together…well, if there’s any unifying story, I think it’s this one.

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The State of Four Gravitons

This blog is named for a question: does the four-graviton amplitude in N=8 supergravity diverge?

Over the years, Zvi Bern and a growing cast of collaborators have been trying to answer that question. They worked their way up, loop by loop, until they stalled at five loops. Last year, they finally broke the stall, and last week, they published the result of the five-loop calculation. They find that N=8 supergravity does not diverge at five loops in four dimensions, but does diverge in 24/5 dimensions. I thought I’d write a brief FAQ about the status so far.

Q: Wait a minute, 24/5 dimensions? What does that mean? Are you talking about fractals, or…

Nothing so exotic. The number 24/5 comes from a regularization trick. When we’re calculating an amplitude that might be divergent, one way to deal with it is to treat the dimension like a free variable. You can then see what happens as you vary the dimension, and see when the amplitude starts diverging. If the dimension is an integer, then this ends up matching a more physics-based picture, where you start with a theory in eleven dimensions and curl up the extra ones until you get to the dimension you’re looking for. For fractional dimensions, it’s not clear that there’s any physical picture like this: it’s just a way to talk about how close something is to diverging.

Q: I’m really confused. What’s a graviton? What is supergravity? What’s a divergence?

I don’t have enough space to explain these things here, but that’s why I write handbooks. Here are explanations of gravitons, supersymmetry, and (N=8) supergravity, loops, and divergences. Please let me know if anything in those explanations is unclear, or if you have any more questions.

Q: Why do people think that N=8 supergravity will diverge at seven loops?

There’s a useful rule of thumb in quantum field theory: anything that can happen, will happen. In this case, that means if there’s a way for a theory to diverge that’s consistent with the symmetries of the theory, then it almost always does diverge. In the past, that meant that people expected N=8 supergravity to diverge at five loops. However, researchers found a previously unknown symmetry that looked like it would forbid the five-loop divergence, and only allow a divergence at seven loops (in four dimensions). Zvi and co.’s calculation confirms that the five-loop divergence doesn’t show up.

More generally, string theory not only avoids divergences but clears up other phenomena, like black holes. These two things seem tied together: string theory cleans up problems in quantum gravity in a consistent, unified way. There isn’t a clear way for N=8 supergravity on its own to clean up these kinds of problems, which makes some people skeptical that it can match string theory’s advantages. Either way N=8 supergravity, unlike string theory, isn’t a candidate theory of nature by itself: it would need to be modified in order to describe our world, and no-one has suggested a way to do that.

Q: Why do people think that N=8 supergravity won’t diverge at seven loops?

There’s a useful rule of thumb in amplitudes: amplitudes are weird. In studying amplitudes we often notice unexpected simplifications, patterns that uncover new principles that weren’t obvious before.

Gravity in general seems to have a lot of these kinds of simplifications. Even without any loops, its behavior is surprisingly tame: it’s a theory that we can build up piece by piece from the three-particle interaction, even though naively we shouldn’t be able to (for the experts: I’m talking about large-z behavior in BCFW). This behavior seems to have an effect on one-loop amplitudes as well. There are other ways in which gravity seems better-behaved than expected, overall this suggests that we still have a fair ways to go before we understand all of the symmetries of gravity theories.

Supersymmetric gravity in particular also seems unusually well-behaved. N=5 supergravity was expected to diverge at four loops, but doesn’t. N=4 supergravity does diverge at four loops, but that seems to be due to an effect that is specific to that case (for the experts: an anomaly).

For N=8 specifically, a suggestive hint came from varying the dimension. If you checked the dimension in which the theory diverged at each loop, you’d find it matched the divergences of another theory, N=4 super Yang-Mills. At l loops, N=4 super Yang-Mills diverges in dimension 4+6/l. From that formula, you can see that no matter how much you increase l, you’ll never get to four dimensions: in four dimensions, N=4 super Yang-Mills doesn’t diverge.

At five loops, N=4 super Yang-Mills diverges in 26/5 dimensions. Zvi Bern made a bet with supergravity expert Kelly Stelle that the dimension would be the same for N=8 supergravity: a bottle of California wine from Bern versus English wine from Stelle. Now that they’ve found a divergence in 24/5 dimensions instead, Stelle will likely be getting his wine soon.

Q: It sounds like the calculation was pretty tough. Can they still make it to seven loops?

I think so, yes. Doing the five-loop calculation they noticed simplifications, clever tricks uncovered by even more clever grad students. The end result is that if they just want to find out whether the theory diverges then they don’t have to do the “whole calculation”, just part of it. This simplifies things a lot. They’ll probably have to find a few more simplifications to make seven loops viable, but I’m optimistic that they’ll find them, and in the meantime the new tricks should have some applications in other theories.

Q: What do you think? Will the theory diverge?

I’m not sure.

To be honest, I’m a bit less optimistic than I used to be. The agreement of divergence dimensions between N=8 supergravity and N=4 super Yang-Mills wasn’t the strongest argument (there’s a reason why, though Stelle accepted the bet on five loops, string theorist Michael Green is waiting on seven loops for his bet). Fractional dimensions don’t obviously mean anything physically, and many of the simplifications in gravity seem specific to four dimensions. Still, it was suggestive, the kind of “motivation” that gets a conjecture started.

Without that motivation, none of the remaining arguments are specific to N=8. I still think unexpected simplifications are likely, that gravity overall behaves better than we yet appreciate. I still would bet on seven loops being finite. But I’m less confident about what it would mean for the theory overall. That’s going to take more serious analysis, digging in to the anomaly in N=4 supergravity and seeing what generalizes. It does at least seem like Zvi and co. are prepared to undertake that analysis.

Regardless, it’s still worth pushing for seven loops. Having that kind of heavy-duty calculation in our sub-field forces us to improve our mathematical technology, in the same way that space programs and particle colliders drive technology in the wider world. If you think your new amplitudes method is more efficient than the alternatives, the push to seven loops is the ideal stress test. Jacob Bourjaily likes to tell me how his prescriptive unitarity technique is better than what Zvi and co. are doing, this is our chance to find out!

Overall, I still stand by what I say in my blog’s sidebar. I’m interested in N=8 supergravity, I’d love to find out whether the four-graviton amplitude diverges…and now that the calculation is once again making progress, I expect that I will.

By Any Other Author Would Smell as Sweet

I was chatting with someone about this paper (which probably deserves a post in its own right, once I figure out an angle that isn’t just me geeking out about how much I could do with their new setup), and I referred to it as “Claude’s paper”. This got me chided a bit: the paper has five authors, experts on Feynman diagrams and elliptic integrals. It’s not just “Claude’s paper”. So why do I think of it that way?

Part of it, I think, comes from the experience of reading a paper. We want to think of a paper as a speech act: someone talking to us, explaining something, leading us through a calculation. Our brain models that as a conversation with a single person, so we naturally try to put a single face to a paper. With a collaborative paper, this is almost never how it was written: different sections are usually written by different people, who then edit each other’s work. But unless you know the collaborators well, you aren’t going to know who wrote which section, so it’s easier to just picture one author for the whole thing.

Another element comes from how I think about the field. Just as it’s easier to think of a paper as the speech of one person, it’s easier to think of new developments as continuations of a story. I at least tend to think about the field in terms of specific programs: these people worked on this, which is a continuation of that. You can follow those kinds of threads though the field, but in reality they’re tangled together: collaborations are an opportunity for two programs to meet. In other fields you might have a “first author” to default to, but in theoretical physics we normally write authors alphabetically. For “Claude’s paper”, it just feels like the sort of thing I’d expect Claude Duhr to write, like a continuation of the other things he’s known for, even if it couldn’t have existed without the other four authors.

You’d worry that associating papers with people like this takes away deserved credit. I don’t think it’s quite that simple, though. In an older post I described this paper as the work of Anastasia Volovich and Mark Spradlin. On some level, that’s still how I think about it. Nevertheless, when I heard that Cristian Vergu was going to be at the Niels Bohr Institute next year, I was excited: we’re hiring one of the authors of GSVV! Even if I don’t think of him immediately when I think of the paper, I think of the paper when I think of him.

That, I think, is more important for credit. If you’re a hiring committee, you’ll start out by seeing names of applicants. It’s important, at that point, that you know what they did, that the authors of important papers stand out, that you assign credit where it’s due. It’s less necessary on the other end, when you’re reading a paper and casually classify it in your head.

Nevertheless, I should be more careful about credit. It’s important to remember that “Claude Duhr’s paper” is also “Johannes Broedel’s paper” and “Falko Dulat’s paper”, “Brenda Penante’s paper” and “Lorenzo Tancredi’s paper”. It gives me more of an appreciation of where it comes from, so I can get back to having fun applying it.

At Least One Math Term That Makes Sense

I’ve complained before about how mathematicians name things. Mathematicans seem to have a knack for taking an ordinary bland word that’s almost indistinguishable from the other ordinary, bland words they’ve used before and assigning it an incredibly specific mathematical concept. Varieties and forms, motives and schemes, in each case you end up wishing they picked a word that was just a little more descriptive.

Sometimes, though, a word may seem completely out of place when it actually has a fairly reasonable explanation. Such is the case for the word “period“.

Suppose you want to classify numbers. You have the integers, and the rational numbers. A bigger class of numbers are “algebraic”, in that you can get them “from algebra”: more specifically, as solutions of polynomial equations with rational coefficients. Numbers that aren’t algebraic are “transcendental”, a popular example being \pi.

Periods lie in between: a set that contains algebraic numbers, but also many of the transcendental numbers. They’re numbers you can get, not from algebra, but from calculus: they’re integrals over rational functions. These numbers were popularized by Kontsevich and Zagier, and they’ve led to a lot of fruitful inquiry in both math and physics.

But why the heck are they called periods?

Think about e^{i x}.

euler13

Or if you prefer, think about a circle

e^{i x} is a periodic function, with period 2\pi.  Take x from 0 to 2\pi and the function repeats, you’ve traveled in a circle.

Thought of another way, 2\pi is the volume of the circle. It’s the integral, around the circle, of \frac{dz}{z}. And that integral nicely matches Kontsevich and Zagier’s definition of a period.

The idea of a period, then, comes from generalizing this. What happens when you only go partway around the circle, to some point z in the complex plane? Then you need to go to a point x=-i \ln z. So a logarithm can also be thought of as measuring the period of e^{i x}. And indeed, since a logarithm can be expressed as \int\frac{dz}{z}, they count as periods in the Kontsevich-Zagier sense.

Starting there, you can loosely think about the polylogarithm functions I like to work with as collections of logs, measuring periods of interlocking circles.

And if you need to go beyond polylogarithms, when you can’t just go circle by circle?

Then you need to think about functions with two periods, like Weierstrass’s elliptic function. Just as you can think about e^{i x} as a circle, you can think of Weierstrass’s function in terms of a torus.

torus_1000

Obligatory donut joke here

The torus has two periods, corresponding to the two circles you can draw around it. The periods of Weierstrass’s function are transcendental numbers, and they fit Kontsevich and Zagier’s definition of periods. And if you take the inverse of Weierstrass’s function, you get an elliptic integral, just like taking the inverse of e^{i x} gives a logarithm.

So mathematicians, I apologize. Periods, at least, make sense.

I’m still mad about “varieties” though.

Tutoring at GGI

I’m still at the Galileo Galilei Institute this week, tutoring at the winter school.

At GGI’s winter school, each week is featuring a pair of lecturers. This week, the lectures alternate between Lance Dixon covering the basics of amplitudeology and Csaba Csaki, discussing ways in which the Higgs could be a composite made up of new fundamental particles.

Most of the students at this school are phenomenologists, physicists who make predictions for particle physics. I’m an amplitudeologist, I study the calculation tools behind those predictions. You’d think these would be very close areas, but it’s been interesting seeing how different our approaches really are.

Some of the difference is apparent just from watching the board. In Csaki’s lectures, the equations that show up are short, a few terms long at most. When amplitudes show up, it’s for their general properties: how many factors of the coupling constant, or the multipliers that show up with loops. There aren’t any long technical calculations, and in general they aren’t needed: he’s arguing about the kinds of physics that can show up, not the specifics of how they give rise to precise numbers.

In contrast, Lance’s board filled up with longer calculations, each with many moving parts. Even things that seem simple from our perspective take a decent amount of board space to derive, and involve no small amount of technical symbol-shuffling. For most of the students, working out an amplitude this complicated was an unfamiliar experience. There are a few applications for which you need the kind of power that amplitudeology provides, and a few students were working on them. For the rest, it was a bit like learning about a foreign culture, an exercise in understanding what other people are doing rather than picking up a new skill themselves. Still, they made a strong go at it, and it was enlightening to see the pieces that ended up mattering to them, and to hear the kinds of questions they asked.

At the GGI Lectures on the Theory of Fundamental Interactions

I’m at the Galileo Galilei Institute for Theoretical Physics in Florence at their winter school, the GGI Lectures on the Theory of Fundamental Interactions. Next week I’ll be helping Lance Dixon teach Amplitudeology, this week, I’m catching the tail end of Ira Rothstein’s lectures.

IMG_20180112_082716844

The Galileo Galilei Institute, at the end of a long, winding road filled with small, speedy cars and motorcycles, in classic Italian fashion

Rothstein has been heavily involved in doing gravitational wave calculations using tools from quantum field theory, something that has recently captured a lot of interest from amplitudes people. Specifically, he uses Effective Field Theory, theories that are “effectively” true at some scale but hide away higher-energy physics. In the case of gravitational waves, these theories are a powerful way to calculate the waves that LIGO and VIRGO can observe without using the full machinery of general relativity.

After seeing Rothstein’s lectures, I’m reminded of something he pointed out at the QCD Meets Gravity conference in December. He emphasized then that even if amplitudes people get very good at drawing diagrams for classical general relativity, that won’t be the whole story: there’s a series of corrections needed to “match” between the quantities LIGO is able to see and the ones we’re able to calculate. Different methods incorporate these corrections in different ways, and the most intuitive approach for us amplitudes folks may still end up cumbersome once all the corrections are included. In typical amplitudes fashion, this just makes me wonder if there’s a shortcut: some way to compute, not just a piece that gets plugged in to an Effective Field Theory story, but the waves LIGO sees in one fell swoop (or at least, the part where gravity is weak enough that our methods are still useful). That’s probably a bit naive of me, though.

Proofs and Insight

Hearing us talking about the Amplituhedron, the professor across the table chimed in.

“The problem with you amplitudes people, I never know what’s a conjecture and what’s proven. The Amplituhedron, is that still a conjecture?”

The Amplituhedron, indeed, is still a conjecture (although a pretty well-supported one at this point). After clearing that up, we got to talking about the role proofs play in theoretical physics.

The professor was worried that we weren’t being direct enough in stating which ideas in amplitudes had been proven. While I agreed that we should be clearer, one of his points stood out to me: he argued that one benefit of clearly labeling conjectures is that it motivates people to go back and prove things. That’s a good thing to do in general, to be sure that your conjecture is really true, but often it has an added benefit: even if you’re pretty sure your conjecture is true, proving it can show you why it’s true, leading to new and valuable insight.

There’s a long history of important physics only becoming clear when someone took the time to work out a proof. But in amplitudes right now, I don’t think our lack of proofs is leading to a lack of insight. That’s because the kinds of things we’d like to prove often require novel insight themselves.

It’s not clear what it would take to prove the Amplituhedron. Even if you’ve got a perfectly clear, mathematically nice definition for it, you’d still need to prove that it does what it’s supposed to do: that it really calculates scattering amplitudes in N=4 super Yang-Mills. In order to do that, you’d need a very complete understanding of how those calculations work. You’d need to be able to see how known methods give rise to something like the Amplituhedron, or to find the Amplituhedron buried deep in the structure of the theory.

If you had that kind of insight? Then yeah, you could prove the Amplituhedron, and accomplish remarkable things along the way. But more than that, if you had that sort of insight, you would prove the Amplituhedron. Even if you didn’t know about the Amplituhedron to begin with, or weren’t sure whether or not it was a conjecture, once you had that kind of insight proving something like the Amplituhedron would be the inevitable next step. The signpost, “this is a conjecture” is helpful for other reasons, but it doesn’t change circumstances here: either you have what you need, or you don’t.

This contrasts with how progress works in other parts of physics, and how it has worked at other times. Sometimes, a field is moving so fast that conjectures get left by the wayside, even when they’re provable. You get situations where everyone busily assumes something is true and builds off it, and no-one takes the time to work out why. In that sort of field, it can be really valuable to clearly point out conjectures, so that someone gets motivated to work out the proof (and to hopefully discover something along the way).

I don’t think amplitudes is in that position though. It’s still worthwhile to signal our conjectures, to make clear what needs a proof and what doesn’t. But our big conjectures, like the Amplituhedron, aren’t the kind of thing someone can prove just by taking some time off and working on it. They require new, powerful insight. Because of that, our time is typically best served looking for that insight, finding novel examples and unusual perspectives that clear up what’s really going on. That’s a fair bit broader an activity than just working out a proof.